Ansar Allah: The Albatross of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait

Understanding the Implications and Capabilities of the Iran-Houthi Consortium

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, situated between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, is an immensely strategic location for global maritime trade and geopolitical influence. The strait is a critical maritime chokepoint, connecting the Red Sea, and by extension the Mediterranean Sea, to the Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean, and also by extension, the Pacific Ocean. At its narrowest point, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is 18 miles wide, further limiting tankers to two-mile-wide channels for shipping.¹ Nations within the direct proximity of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and Gulf of Aden are as follows: Yemen, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia; however, significant portions of maritime disruption within the region other than Somali pirates, who normally operate in the Indian Ocean, stems from Ansar Allah, referring to the military wing of the Houthi movement in Yemen.

Zaydiyyah, Houthis, and Yemen

Within Yemen, Shia is the largest religious minority group. Within the Yemeni Shia group, Zaydis comprises the largest concentration. This is distinctly unique to Yemen as the largest Shia group globally is Twelver Shia, with significant representation in Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain. The Houthis are Zaydi Shiites, also known as Zaydiyyah, referring to Zayd bin Ali, the great grandson of Ali, the Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law. Zayd bin Ali is an important figure in Islamic history because he led an uprising in 740² against the Umayyad Empire, resulting in his death. Because of his death and revolt, Zayd bin Ali is revered by Zaydis as a symbol of purity against regimes of corruption. Additionally, Zaydis do not believe in the concepts of Ayatollahs, nor do they practice the doctrine of Taqiyyah³, which is a practice to hide your belief and religious duty when faced with death or serious harm.

The Zaydi political power structure and presence dates back to 1634⁴ with the retreat of the Ottomans from Yemen (the Ottomans would return to rule from 1849-1918). Upon the defeat and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the Zaydi Imamate returned to govern Northern Yemen until the 1962 Arab Republican revolution while Great Britain occupied Aden and Southern Yemen until 1967. In 1978, Zaydi General Ali Abdullah Saleh came to power until the 2011 Arab Springs. During Saleh’s reign, Yemen would unite in 1990 and generally, not fully aligned, with the United States against Al-Qaeda but would become mostly occupied by the rise of Hussein al-Houthi throughout the 1990s. Utilizing the legacy of Zayd bin Ali, Hussein al-Houthi declared Saleh, a fellow Zaydi, as corrupt and condemned both Saudi Arabia and the United States for providing support to sustain the Saleh regime.

The point of radical militarization of the Houthi movement was the US 2003 invasion of Iraq by the adopting of the slogan: “God is great, death to the US, death to Israel, curse the Jews, and victory for Islam” and renamed themselves Ansar Allah (Supporters of God).⁵ In 2004, Hussein al-Houthi was killed by Saleh and the Yemeni armed forces while aggressively suppressing the Houthi rebellion; however, the Houthi movement demonstrated battlefield acumen against both Saudi and Yemeni forces. The ousting of Saleh occurred in 2011 during the regional phenomena referred to as the Arab Springs, which catalyzed in Tunisia with Mohamed Bouazizi self-immolation on December 17, 2010, but is largely due to systematic historical regional political corruption, unemployment, poverty, demographic shifts, energy crises, and kleptocracy. Despite Saleh being ousted and replaced by Sunni Vice-President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, the Houthis declared both Hadi and the process of his ascension as both corrupt and illegitimate. Beginning in 2014, the Houthis and Saleh began forming an alliance, incorporating Saleh loyalists across the armed forces into the new axis against President Hadi.

The culmination of the Saleh-Houthi alliance occurred in 2015 with the seizing of Sana’a and the port of Hodeidah. Continual successes by the Houthis resulted in the beginning of Operation Decisive Storm in March 2015 by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan, and Morrocco with the support of the United States, United Kingdom, and France. Egypt, Pakistan, and Oman refused to provide troops to the war. Despite decisive, quick victory as promised by the Saudi-coalition, a humanitarian crisis consisting of mass starvation and public health occurred in large part due to an enforced blockade. In 2017⁶, Saleh declared Houthis were Iranian puppets, resulting in Houthis assassinating Saleh. The death of Saleh and increasing domestic support for the Houthis contributed to the establishment of strategic partnerships and coordination between the Houthis and Iran against Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Israel. The strategic partnership became increasingly public with Houthi drone and ballistic missile targeting of Saudi energy and civilian infrastructures in the Persian Gulf and the scope of Houthi military operations against the Saudi-led coalition. Between 2017 and 2023, Ansar Allah has advanced their capabilities to instigate maritime disruption in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait but also expanded missile and UAV drone ranges to reach Israel as demonstrated in their entry in the Hamas-Israel War after October 7, 2023.

Power Structure of Ansar Allah:

Photo by Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2022) Depicting Houthi Apparatus

After the death of Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, the founder of the Houthi movement, his youngest brother ‘Abd al-Malik Badr al-Din al-Huthi became the leader of the Houthi movement in 2004. It is through the leadership and political structure style of ‘Abd al-Malik the influences of Iran and Hezbollah manifests within Houthi operations. Between 2004 and 2010, six Houthi wars occurred between the Houthis and the Yemeni government. By 2010, ‘Abd al-Malik begun the structuring of a new command system that positioned ‘Abd al-Malik as the supreme commander of the Houthi forces but also the spiritual leader similar to the role and governance style of Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah. The transition toward the new structure begins with the formation of the central command cadre⁷, consisting of individuals slightly younger than ‘Abd al-Malik that have no recollection of the movement prior to Irani-Hezbollah contact and coordination. This central command between 2010-2015 became the distinct rulers of Northern Yemen; however, the three main individuals that ensure the maintaining of ‘Abd al-Malik’s position, the relationship between the Houthis and Iran/Hezbollah, and the connection between the Houthis and Yemeni government⁸:

1. Ahmed Mohammed Yahya Hamid: Director of the President of the Supreme Political Council Mahdi al’Mashat’s office and the Government Works Authority

2. Ahsan al-Humran: Preventative Security Chief and oversees Houthi intelligence agencies

3. Abdalkarim Amir al-Din: Minister of Interior in Houthi-controlled Sana’a government with ties to the IRGC and Hezbollah

Coinciding with increased Iranian and Hezbollah support to the Houthis around the time of the sixth Sa’da War, the Houthis’ Jihad Council was formed but became public⁹ in 2018. Furthermore, the structure and operations of the Houthis’ Jihad Council nearly resembles the structure and operations of Hezbollah’s Jihad Council:

Similar structures can be found, especially regarding the role of IRGC-QF liaison representatives and advisors with a Hezbollah deputy, with Kata’ib Hezbollah in Iraq. Through this liaison, Iran is able to determine the scope of technical assistance and geopolitical suggestions to Houthi leadership in similar operations between Iran and Hezbollah, providing the depiction that the Houthis and Hezbollah operate independently from Iran.

Photo by Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2022) Depicting Houthi Military Regional Commands

Regarding integration into the Yemeni military apparatus, since 2014¹⁰, the Houthis progressively integrated Ansar Allah into Yemeni state security forces and senior leadership within the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior while also enticing Generals from the Saleh-era to serve with senior Ansar Allah officials. The seizure of the Ministry of Defense enhances Ansar Allah training, personnel recruitment, and sustaining forces with military equipment. A similar trait of this occurring is in Iraq regarding the Popular Mobilization Forces and the integration of Pro-Iran Shia militias into the state security apparatus. With Ansar Allah, Houthi and militias and Pro-Houthi tribes have become integrated into the Ministry of Defense under the General Mobilization Authority, which is overseen by the Houthi Jihad Preparation Official (Official of the Central Committee for Recruitment and Mobilization) to find and recruit military-age males for either special forces, technical specialist roles, or general military training and post-2014 Ansar Allah ideological re-education.¹¹ Additionally, Ansar Allah Jihad Preparation Official is formalizing¹² what is referred to as the Logistics and Support Brigades, similar in structure and operation to the Iran Basij forces. It is with these forces that Ansar Allah launch ballistic missiles and UAV drones toward Eilat, Israel and partake in the production of propaganda media footage.

New Capabilities of Ansar Allah:

Despite difficulty for Houthis to legally acquire defense weaponry and equipment, the Houthi-Iran-Hezbollah relationship since 2009 and after 2014 is the weaponry and technical assistance artery the Houthis depend on for defense acquisition and technology advancements. The gradual growth of technological prowess demonstrated by the Houthis is a severe regional and global threat taking into consideration Ansar Allah’s position in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Production of Iranian-origin low-cost UAV and ballistic missiles in addition to a large, impoverished workforce population prompts a cheap industrial base geared toward permanent mobilization and constant ideological warfare provides the Houthis with the capabilities and capacity to produce a robust arsenal of lethal weaponry.

The most recent Houthi military parade on September 21 was a demonstration of the mentioned facts above and provided further revelation on the scope of Houthi-Iranian collaboration. During the military parade, Ansar Allah revealed the following¹³:

1. Toufan: Long-range ballistic missile with a range of approximately 2,000 km, based on Iranian Ghadr ballistic missile

2. Tankeel: Medium-range ballistic missile that can operate as an anti-ship missile, likely based off Iranian Raad-500 missile

3. Aqeel: Long-range ballistic missile with a range of 800 km, based on Iranian Qiam missile

4. Quds-4 Cruise Missile (3 other variants): Precision guided missile with a range up to 2,000 km, likely based on the Iranian Soumar/Hoveyzeh missiles

Lacking a legitimate domestic defense industrial base, Houthis will continue to largely depend on the defense expertise, assistance, training, and guidance from the IRGC-QF and Hezbollah. The components are highly probably to be imported via the Hudaydah Port and assembled in Yemen. Despite Iranian origin of the components and the presence of the missiles, it is also important to remember there is not a cohesive domestic professional defense industrial base, therefore, the effectiveness of assembly and success in production capabilities should always be questioned. However, the Houthis have demonstrated throughout history their resolve and ability to defy adversaries with advanced capabilities. This is present in the clashes between Houthis and Saudis since the 1930s but more recently during the Houthi-Yemeni wars between 2004-2015 and the subsequent Houthi-Saudi coalition war that began in 2015.

Other than missiles, the second leg of the Ansar Allah triad are combat and reconnaissance drones. The first demonstration of Houthi drone capabilities began in 2017 and exponentially expanded¹⁴ since then:

1. Samad 1-3 UAV: Reconnaissance and Loitering Munition - 1,500 km range and 18 kg payload

2. Qasef-1 and 2: Attack UAV - 150 km range and 30 kg payload

3. Rased: Reconnaissance UAV - 35 km

4. Hudhhud: Reconnaissance UAV - 30 km

5. Raqib: Reconnaissance UAV - 15 km

The final angle of the Ansar Allah triad pertains to the maritime domain. Since the Houthi-Saudi Coalition War beginning in 2015, coordination between Iran and the Houthi accelerated. The coordination included not just loitering munitions and ballistic missiles but also anti-ship capabilities in the form of anti-ship missiles and fast attack ship tactics. Extensively, anchoring the Saviz intelligence ship¹⁵ under the disguise of a cargo vessel off the coast of Eritrea, Iran provided real time intelligence reports and assessments to the Houthis until it was damaged by the Israelis in April 2021 and replaced by another intelligence ship called the Behshad. Since 2015-2016, the Houthis have expanded their maritime capabilities to include fast attack patrol crafts, water-borne improvised explosive devices (WBIEDs), anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-ship missile systems, and naval mines. Below is the list¹⁶ of Ansar Allah maritime capabilities based on the above-mentioned categories:

1. Fast Attack Patrol Craft

   1. Aseef-1 (Armed with 23mm ZU-23 or 12.7mm DShK)

   2. Aseef-2

   3. Aseef-3 (Armed with 4 x 107mm MRLs & 1 x 12.7mm DShK)

   4. Malah (Armed with 1 x 14.5mm KPV)

2. Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices

   1. Tawfan-1

   2. Tawfan-2

   3. Tawfan-3

   4. Unknown WBIED Based on Al Fattan 10-Metres PB

3. Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles and Rockets

   1. Moheet (Repurposed Soviet V-750 missile from S-75 SAM)

   2. Khalij Fars “Aasif”

   3. Al-Bahr Al-Ahmar

   4. Fajr-4CL “Faleq-1”

4. Anti-Ship Missile Systems

   1. P-15 Termit “Ro’beige” (Inherited from Pre-War Yemeni Navy)

   2. P-15M Termit “Rubezh”

   3. C-801 “Al-Mandab-1”

   4. Qader “Al-Mandab-2”

   5. Noor “C-802”

5. Naval Mines

   1. Aseef 1-4

   2. Karrar 1-3

   3. Masjur 1-2

   4. Mersad

   5. Auwais

   6. Al-Nazi’at

   7. Mujahid

   8. Shawaz

   9. Thaqib

Ansar Allah is the Bab el-Mandeb Albatross:

Global shipping and trade will continue to be under constant threat for as long as Ansar Allah maintains its positions in Yemen and its relationship with Iran and Hezbollah. The Houthis are operating within the regional apparatus Iran has constructed post-1979 to guarantee the rise of Tehran as the regional power. The relationship between Ansar Allah and Iran formed under criticisms and condemnations of Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States. Despite being Shia, the Houthis firmly believe they are their own sect of Islam (Zaydis) and are different from the Twelvers Shia in many ways than one but maintaining the historical legacy to fight against a perceived corruption in others, even if it means disregarding their own corruption, the Houthis and Iran forged a partnership that enhances Iran’s influence and leverage on two of the world’s most strategic maritime chokepoints.

Ansar Allah throughout the 21st century has demonstrated their capabilities to wage war against the odds whether that be the Saleh regime, Israel, or the Saudi-led coalition. Since 2004, the Houthis have incorporated the lessons learned and guidance from both the IRGC-QF and Hezbollah to the experiences and environment of Yemen to produce a new ideological battleground of permanent mobilization, permanent war, and permanent jihad. The entry of Ansar Allah into the Hamas-Israel War after the October 7 Operation Al-Aqsa Flood has further provided Iran the opportunity to entrench itself in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait to open an additional front against Israel and the United States to exhaust Tel Aviv and seek to over-extend and exhaust US logistics and force posture. With the cluttering of the Red Sea with naval ships not just from the United States and Israel but also the lingering ships of China, maritime shipping in the region has become fragile and unstable, providing additional opportunity to Ansar Allah and Iran to entangle the region closer to war despite diplomatic rhetoric from Iran to avoid this scenario.

The greatest scenario moving forward would be the continuation of the Saudi-Israeli relations normalization process and the formation of a comprehensive containment strategy against Iranian influences. Easier said than done as Iran entrenches itself within nations such as Iraq, Qatar, Bahrain, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Yemen while expanding their influences and partnerships to nations such as Venezuela, Mali, and Nigeria. The raging conflict in the Middle East plays directly into the propaganda and narrative warfare capabilities of the Houthis in Yemen, further entrenching their control and presence throughout the nation, even in areas that are not Pro-Houthi; however, the aspects of tribalism and sectarianism are still rampant; therefore, a cohesive domestic front against Ansar Allah is weak as the Houthis become embedded in Yemeni military, intelligence, security forces, and law enforcement.

Nations such as Egypt with Saudi Arabia must become more assertive in the stability of the Red Sea and assist in the mitigation of Houthi maritime activity that intentionally destabilizes and weaken confidence in the US ability to ensure freedom of navigation. Similar to the stature of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Ansar Allah has managed to elevate itself to near parity with Hezbollah in capabilities and ideological fervor. With a jihadi militant network in all four corners of the Middle East, Iran has implemented a regional mouse trap that if activated will bring the systematic destruction of five nations…and that five does not include Iran.

1

The bab el-mandeb strait is a strategic route for oil and natural gas shipments. Homepage - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). (2017, August 27). https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=41073

2

Riedel, B., & Byman, D. L. (2022, March 9). Who are the houthis, and why are we at war with them?. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/

3

Stefon, M. (n.d.). Taqiyyah. Encyclopædia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/taqiyyah

4

Agency, S.-Y. N. (2019, May 27). Colonialism in Yemen: Ottomans, British. سبأ نت - وكالة الانباء اليمنية سبأ - وكالة سبأ. https://www.saba.ye/en/news537416.htm

5

Riedel, B., & Byman, D. L. (2022, March 9). Who are the houthis, and why are we at war with them?. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/

6

Riedel, B. (2017, December 6). In Yemen, Iran outsmarts Saudi Arabia again. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/in-yemen-iran-outsmarts-saudi-arabia-again/

Knights, M., Al-Gabarni, A., & Coombs, C. (2022, October). The Houthi Jihad Council: Command and control in “the other Hezbollah.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-houthi-jihad-council-command-and-control-in-the-other-hezbollah/

7.

8. ibid.

9. ibid.

10. ibid.

11. ibid.

12. ibid.

13

How the houthis built their arsenal: Defense and intelligence procurement. Counter Extremism Project. (n.d.). https://www.counterextremism.com/content/how-houthis-built-their-arsenal-defense-and-intelligence-procurement

14

Al-Mashareq. (2022, May 5). Nurtured by Iran, Houthis’ drone arsenal is “most advanced” among its proxies. https://almashareq.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_am/features/2022/05/05/feature-03

15

Mitzer , S., & Oliemans, J. (2023, January 2). A maritime menace: The Houthi Navy. Oryx. https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2023/01/a-maritime-menace-houthi-navy.html

16. ibid.